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JAPAN AS CAPITAL EXPORTER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
BY MASARU YOSHITOMI

( OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 18, GROUP OF THEIRTY, NEW YORK)
Sound financial system is copsidered central to the development of trade either in an
economy or internationally. This fact informed the author of this Occasional paper in
examining and bringing into focus how Japan became an international creditor i.e. net
capital exporter in the world financial system aside from her leading role in world trade.
This position was attained through a combination of many factors, some of which were
sectoral savings-investment imbalances and the co-existence of high-employment
government deficit and the high-employment current account surplus in the 1970s and
1980s. The author thus, traced the historical evolution of Japan•s chronic current account
surplus vis-a-vis its impact in the international financial systems back to the end of World
War JI in 1945 when she was an immature debtor country with a regulated financial .
system. Although it was written in 1985, the paper is still relevant in the light of free market
economy and economic liberalisation and the concomitant internationalisation of local
economies. The attraction of the paper lies in its exposition on the way Japan moved from
a regulated financial market to an open market system which is found useful for countries
under-going economic liberalisation. Three phases were identified in the evolution of
Japanese balance of payment since 1945 vis: an immature debtor country with current
account deficits (1945-64, stage 1); then it became a matured debtor country with
current-account surplus, but still with net payment of investment income (1965-1971,
stage II); and finally an immature creditor country with current-account income (1972present, stage m).Ap,ut from the introd11dion, the paper has seven sections as follows:
Section II Evolution or ,Japan's balance of payments; Section Ill Co-existence of highemployment government deficit and a high-employment current account surplus; and
Section IV Domestic pressure for liberalisation of Japanese financial market. The next
three sections were Transition from bank credit control to the open money market
paradigm; Internationalisation of the Japanese financial market; and Policy problems
facing Japan's future possible position in the international financial system.
The three stages of the Japanese balance of payments position as mentioned above
were traced in Section II. Stage 1 i.e. 1945-64, which was regarded as high growth period,
was characterised by imposition of import restrictions and foreign exchange controls to
protect the emerging local infant industries (ship-building, Iron and Steel and automobiles) and prevent net capital outflows in order for domestic savings to be bottled up for
high domestic investment under low interest rate financial policy. However, towards the
end of this period, import restrictions were progressively reduced from 59 per cent to 7
per cent of total imports in 1964. Japan thus became an article 8 member of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and joined Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) in 1964. In stage II, further deregulations of the economy
continued in both import and foreign exchange areas, while liberalisation of foreign direct
investment into Japan which started in 1967 was completed in 1973. This stage was
therefore a transitional period from stage 1 when the economy was fully protected
towards stage III where such regul,ttions were decontrolled to the international average
levels of advanced countries, although her financial system relied on direct control of bank
credit, under which domestic credits were rationed by the Bank of Japan under low
interest rate policy. Stage III was a period when her economy was fully liberalised and its
financial system internationalised through substantial removal of trade restrictions and
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146 CBfflll\L BANK OF. NIGFJllt\ ECONOMIC /IND nw,Ncw. RJM:W VOL 31 N0.2

the use of floating exchange rate system.
Section III highlighted Japan's persistent current account surplus in spite of the two
oil-crises christened Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC I
1974-75 and OPEC 11 (1979-80). This position hinged on the private sector's (corporate
and household) high propensity to save which was in excess of corporate investments
relative to GNP, starting from stage II through stage III. Corresponding to the excess of
private savings, the government registered deterioration in its 1-S balance between
1972 and 1982 while foreign sector deficit i.e. the surplus of Japan's current account
also declined slightly due to oil deficits under OPEC II. Howeve,;,-the excess private
savings due to decline in the GNP ratio of private expenditure on plant and equipment
were more or less offset by the increase in the ratio of government deficit to GNP,
without much affecting the GNP ratio of the current account surplus. It is important to
note that government deficit increased only to the extent of the excess private savings
generated by the lower private investment ratio and not a unilateral creation of new
money by government. Another major fundamental factor of this scenario was the
existence of extreme difference in the growth rate of exports and imports especially at
constant prices. For example, while the export grew by 11.6 per cent~ year, imports
expanded by only 2.2 per cent per annum, all in real terms between 1972 and 1982.
The resultant growth in r~al external surplus accounted for 32.4 per cent of the
expansion in real GNP. lnspite of this marvellous results, Japan, rather than produce
for improving living standards at home spent nearly 10 per cent of her real GNP on
producing for exports to offset oil deficits in order to arrest a situation of financing higher
oil bills on a permanent basis. Japan might have had tooorrow if this strategy was not
adopted.
Section IV of the paper examined the causes of the co-existence of highemployment government deficit and high-employment current account surplus on
which basis she established herself as a capital exporter. lnrloing this, short-run effects
of domestic under-employment, business cycles which caused cyclical budget imbalances, as well as world economic conditions, petroleum price changes and exchange
rates were eliminated to get her true cw-rent a,ccount position at normal or natural levels.
After deseasonalising all short term factors both endogenous and exogenous, between
1965 and 1981 cfnd using Economic Planning Agency (EPA) World Economic Model
(1984) and Hoop and Tyron Study based on MCM (Multi-Country Model), it was
established that the a<;tual external surplus of Japan was influenced by two conflicting
factors - the evervalued dollar (i.e. the undervalued yen) and the ·state of the
international business cycle. When the high-employment external surplus was combined with the sectorial 1-S balance, the period between 1970 and early 1980s i.e. stage
III in the evolution of her balance of payments when she became capital exporter, the
newly emerged excess private sector savings were absorbed by the growth of the budget
deficits, with little change in the underlying current account surplus.
In Section V, attention w~ focused on domestic pressures for liberalisation of the
Japanese Financial market. Two factors account~d for this.First, the deceleration in
corporate investment ratio to GNP which resulted in high corporate capital formation
(from 33.8 per cent in 1970 to 76.8 per cent in 1984 for all industries) allowing for
availability of idle funds to be invested in financial assets. The second reason was, as
a fall out from the high-employment government deficit, massive amounts of national
bonds were is$ued every year since 1975 to finance its deficits,and thus quickly
accumu~ted an fmaocial institutions' balance sheets. Besides, for Ministry of Fmance
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and that its macro policy should be expansionary. What should be done was to judge
whether the size of the existing surplus is larger or smaller than the high-employment
current account smplw; and delrmnine lhe basic c.111scs of the periphcrnl part of lhe
current account surplus.Trade fictions, the author agreed, could arise as the real exports
of a fast growing economy expands more rapidly than the slow growing domestic
market of trading partner countries. Its was however, observed that trade barriers
imposed by trading partners on one sector of Japan's exports for the purpose of
discouraging trade in such sector(s) caused her other export sectors to expand even
faster to generate the high-employment current account surplus which corresponded
to high-employment savings investment equilibrium. It was also observed that the
internationalisation of the Japanese financial market would not significantly complicate
the concept of money since yen deposits by non-residents and foreign currency deposits
by residents were already included in the money supply. Although, the development of
the euro-yen market tended to circumvent a tight monetary policy at home, since higher
opportunity cost on commercial bank's reserves will shift bank deposits from domestic
to euro-yen markets. In spite of this, money supply management could still be
performed through open market operations. In the main it was agreed that the
integration of the yen with international capital markets could bring difficulty in
influencing domestic real interest rates independently from developments in world or
dollar real interest rates.

REMARKS
The book is a good compendium on the evolution of Japanese financial system.
The occasional paper made a historical analysis of Japan's financial market from the
position of a net capital importer in 1945 to that of a net capital exporter since the 1970s.
In doing this, particular attention was given to the development of her financial market
from the bank credit-control paradigm where credit was rationed by her central bank
alongside trade restrictions and foreign exchange controls to an open money market
paradigm where her financial system was not only liberalised but also internationalised.
However, during both periods, government financial institutions and long-term credit
banks continued to give out long-term loans at low (i.e. below market rate) interest rates
for developmental purposes. Moreover, Japan was cautious in its liberalisation efforts
by not decontrolling the whole of her economy in one fellswoop as each of the three
stages of her balance-of-payments evolution pattern were consciously made to coincide
with first, the dynamic development of her comparative advantage godds; second, the
liberalisation of import restrictions and foreign exchange controls; and third the gradual
transformation of the Japanese financial system from a bank credit-control paradigm
towards a market-determining open money market paradigm. This we observe would
serve as a lesson for third world countries attempting economic deregulation, to go
about it with caution.
It would be observed that Japan was able to develop her financial system to an
enviable position, through the existence of a combination of many factors. Chief
amongst them included high-employment deficit financing; open market operation;
favourable terms of trade through increased investment in the creation of private sector
capacity to 1;>rod11r.e for exports; and financial discipline on the part of government. In
other words, emphasis was placed on stimulation of private hwestment rather than
public sector investment. Two of these factors call for special emphasis. First was
financial discipline which was all pervading in both the public and private sectors.
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(MOF) to redeem and refinance national bonds without disturbing the Capital Market,
it had to issue treasury bills below the market rate at first~ but lateralrnarket rate. At the
same time, commercial banks were allowed to raise funds through Gensaki market (a
short-term transaction of long-term government bonds with repurchase agreements at
market-determined rates); issue Certiftcates of Deposit (CD); and offer foreign currency
deposits since 1978. Other non-bank financial institutions took advantage of this by
investing their idle funds in the Gensaki whose interest rates were higher than regulated
interest rate on time deposits of the same maturity.
With the above developments, it naturally followed that the Japanese fmancial
market moved from a bank credit-c~trol paradigm to an open money market paradigm.
In terms of Modigliani-Papademos (1980) the bank credit paradigm refers to the fmancial
systems in which the non-bank public, mainly the corporate sector, raised its funds ahnost
entirely from the banking system. By contrast, in the open market paradigm, the nonbank public raised its funds in the capital market by relying on marketable instruments
held directly by the public or non-bank financial intermediaries. Thus, while the Central
Bank controls money supply via a control of bank credit in a bank credit paradigm
economy, it does the same through the conduct of open market operations in an open
money market paradigm except that government financial institutions and long-term
credit banks still provided long-term subsidised loans for development purposes. Since
OPEC I, (i.e. 1973-74), macroeconomic forces have facilitated a rapid shift of the
Japanese financial system towards an open market type where interest rates were market
determined both in the primary and secondary securities markets and maturity of bonds
diversified. Above all, the key tnacroeconomicforce pushing her fmancialsystem towards
an open money market paradigm was the co-existence of high-employment deficit and
the high-employment current accow1tsurplus, reflecting the emergence of excess savings
over investment in the private sector as a whole.
Section VII traced the process of internationalisation of the Japanese financial system
to three fundamental factors. These were the near-complete liberalisation of foreign
exchange controls whereby both residents and non-residents freely participated in
foreign exchange market transactions; the liberalisation of domestic interest rates and
related free usage of the euro-yen markets by both residents and non-residents; and the
weakening of the barriers between commercial banks and long-term credit banks,
security houses, trust banks, etc. Thus by 1980, formal exchange controls were dropped
in recognition of the underlying progress of deregulation made in the 1970s. Besides, by
1984, the so-called Japan-US Yen-Dollar Committee completed a report on the
liberalisation and internationalisation of the Japanese financial market. Features of the
agreement were; free access to the euro-yen bond market for fund raising; liberalisation
of both sho~-term and long-term euro-yen IQans; and liberalisation of short-term euroyen CDs by 1984 under the condition that such euro-yen C.Ds would not be sold to
residents. Other agreements reached included the liberalisation of issue rates on shortterm government securities or tBs and the establishment of a yen-denominated BA
(Bankers Acceptances) market, since the yen will become a key currency as a result of
its internationalisation would mean that Japan has to borrow shCl>rt and lend long.
Concluding, section VIII took a periscopic view of policy implications of Japan
becoming a capital exporter. The policy problems were viewed along the areas of
macroeconomic policy; trade frictions; and monetary policy. On whether macroeconomic
policy should be employed to reduce high-employment current account surplus, the
author felt that its existence in Japan does not necessarily inwly weak domestic demand
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Although financial discipline may be regarded as a foregone conclusion in the private
sector, Japan ran budget deficit with due regard to the likely impact of the deficits on the
external sector, while maintaining surplus of savings over investment in the private sector.
This was unlike what obtains in many third world countries including Nigeria which
engage in unilateral creation of money through excessive deficit financing that fuels
domestic inflation. The second factor was promotion of private sector investment. The
private sector was deliberately encouraged by the national government through the
funding of Research and Development (R&D) in many sectors for private sector benefits
and availability of long-term cheap credit from government financial institutions and
long-term credit banks for the development of certain strategic economic activities. As a
concomitant strategy, as soon as private enterprise started maturing between the late
1960s and early 1970s the banking industry and the whole of the financial system was
decontrolled through the introduction of the open money market operation and liberalisation of foreign exchange market.
Nigeria has some characteristics similar to Japan especially in their financial systems
in their developmental process as they both ran bank credit paradigm economy prior to
economic deregulation and liberalisation. Thus, for this reason Nigeria could learn some
lessions from the Japanese experience even though she is a developing country. While
Japan pursued a bank credit paradigm economy alongside current account deficit and
was regarded as a debtor country for about twenty six years (from 1945-1971), in like
manners, independent Nigeria also ran a bank credit paradigm although with regimes of
current account surpluses and deficits. It should, however, be noted that Nigeria was
much more endowed in natural resources. The striking difference in Nigeria's financial
and economic management was that before the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, private sector savings could not adequately finance
government deficits while at the same time very little of bank credit went to private sector
use; there was little or no financial discipline especially in the public sector; private
investment was low while propensity to import was very high without a reciprocal effort
in the export sub-sector in contrast to what obtained in Japan in the reviewed period.
Even after economic and financial deregulation through the introduction of SAP
since 1986, the Nigerian economy is still suffering from lack of financial discipline and
demented private sector initiative. The old habit of high government budget deficits even
in excess of budgetary estimates which had never been adequately financed by private
sector savings continued to be the order of the day. The consequence of this act could
be fatal to the economy, as the high government deficit would not only fuel domestic
inflation but is also capable of crowding out real private sector investment and thus
promote speculative investment and purely merchandising business. Also, with the
overhaulingof the 1962 Exchange Control Act and the freedom to export both primary
commodities and manufactures through the dissolution of Commodity Boards, the
private sector is yet to take the bull by the horn in the export sub-sector. Consequently,
non-official foreign exchange earnings had been very low and never kept pace with
targeted figures from year to year.
The lessons for Nigeria and other third world countries are that financial dJscipline
should be strictly and vigorously pursued especially at the official level in order to avoid
the pitfalls of the past as· a necessary condition in her developmental initiative. The
sufficient condition for Nigeria to move out of her present position of debt trap;
unemployment of resources; and domestic inflation will be to continue to promote private
invesbnents in the production process which started in 1986 not only in principle but in
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practice. In this wise, the sector should be guided through the provision of the right
economic climate, to direct all its energies towards the production of goods and services
not only to serve domestic needs but princ11?ally for export. This way, the nation's foreign
exchange earnings would be increased and thus, not only reduce tension on the official
sources which are grossly inadequate to meet the country's growing needs but also usher
in overall external balance.
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